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An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal
stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account
when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner’s dilemma
game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its
payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe
on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity
profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the
evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how
fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate at
which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns
of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree
players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden
drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need
for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric
dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for
the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.94.062315
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of statistical physics to problems in
evolutionary game theory has proven rewarding and conducive
to inspiring results with a broad range of applicability [1–8].
The successful evolution of cooperation in the realm of
social dilemmas—when what is best for an individual is at
odds with what is best for the society—is a subject that
benefited particularly from this development, with innovative
research revealing key mechanisms that can either promote or
hinder the evolution of socially preferable states [9–22]. More
specifically, it has been shown that phase transitions towards
cooperative states depend on the properties of the interaction
network and the strength of ties, as well as on the number and
type of competing strategies [23–28].
The study of evolutionary dynamics and social dilemmas
using methods borrowed from the physical sciences has been
to a large degree motivated by the seminal work of Nowak
and May [29], who showed that spatial structure might
promote the evolution of cooperation through a mechanism
that is referred to as network reciprocity [30]. During the
last decade, independent research from different groups
demonstrated the importance of heterogeneity of agents for
the successful evolution of cooperation, be it introduced
in the form of heterogeneous interaction networks—note,
however, that for the case of human interactions, it is not clear
whether network reciprocity plays a key role [31,32]—noisy
disturbances to payoffs, or other player-specific properties like
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the teaching activity or the propensity to acquire new links
over time [23,33–48]. Evidently, the consideration of various
sources of heterogeneity is crucial to the subject, especially
concerning the subject of human cooperation [28,49,50], since
our societies are not made up of uniform individuals. On
the contrary, inequalities in wealth, reputation, the number
of friends, and many other measurables characterizing real
life abound.
Motivated by the above considerations, we study the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas, where players
differ in their activity. More precisely, we no longer assume
that players always participate in each round of the game [51]
but rather that their participation is probabilistic, with the
probability depending on either their degree in the network
or their current payoff. We thus obtain a setting with degree-
correlated or payoff-correlated activity patterns, depending on
which criterion is used. Importantly, inactive players, i.e.,
players that do not participate in a particular instance of
the game, get a null payoff and are unable to replicate. In
this sense, our consideration of inactivity is different from
the consideration of loners [52], who can replicate and who
refuse to participate by default in exchange for a small but
fixed income. The treatment of inactivity as a dynamically
changing state of players, rather than a strategy, reveals the
fascinating complexity evoked by different activity patterns
of players. As we will show, while degree-correlated activity
introduces cascading failures of cooperation that can only
be compensated by a tedious spatiotemporal reorganization
of compact cooperative clusters, payoff-correlated activity
provides a more nuanced activity profile that hinders systemic
breakdowns of cooperation and provides optimal conditions
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for cooperators to survive if the exponential decay to baseline
activity is appropriately adjusted.
The continuation of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we first present the details of the studied mathematical
model, while in Sec. III we presented the main results of our
research. We conclude in Sec. IV with a discussion of the
broader implications of our conclusions.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We use the simplified version of the prisoner’s dilemma
game, where the key aspects of the social dilemma are pre-
served but its strength is determined by a single parameter [29].
In particular, mutual cooperation yields the reward R = 1,
mutual defection leads to punishment P = 0, and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S = 0 and
the defector the temptation T > 1. We note that the selection
of this widely used and representative parametrization gives
results that remain valid in a broad range of pairwise social
dilemmas, including the snowdrift and the stag-hunt game.
At this point, we note that the consideration of different
activity patterns does not affect the expected outcome of social
dilemmas in well-mixed populations, so that we thus focus
on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations. As
the interaction network, we use scale-free networks generated
according to the uncorrelated configuration model [53], each
with an average degree k = 4.5 and size N = 104. Cooperators
(C) and defectors (D) are initially distributed uniformly at
random so that they have equal chances for success during the
evolution.
Simulations are performed in agreement with a syn-
chronous updating protocol such that each player i plays
the game with all its ki neighbors and thereby collects the
payoff i . Once all the players collected their payoffs an
evolutionary step takes place. For the evolution of strategies,
we employ the replicator dynamics such that if j > i ,
player j will replicate its strategy sj to the site of player i
with the probability
Psj→si =
j − i
max(kj ,ki)b
. (1)
We perform simulations until the average fraction of coopera-
tors in the population 〈c〉 reaches its long time pattern—note
that it could be an oscillatory or a steady state.
To introduce different activity patterns, we assign to every
player an activation probability Pai ∈ [0,1] according to which
player i participates in a particular round of the game.
Accordingly, with probability 1 − Pai the player i remains
inactive in each round of the game. If a player i is active, it
will play the game with all its ki neighbors, independently from
whether they are active or not, and it will obtain the payoff i
as dictated by all the strategy pairs. If a player i is inactive, it
will not play any games with its neighbors, and accordingly,
its payoff i will be null. Furthermore, only active players
are able to pass their strategy in agreement with the replicator
equation, while inactive players are never able to replicate
because their payoff is always zero (and hence never larger
than the payoff of the neighbor).
Since the introduction of probabilistic participation of
players in each instance of the game introduces a degree
of heterogeneity to the evolutionary time scales and adds a
layer of stochasticity to the spatiotemporal dynamics, it affects
the correlation scales and can induce cascading effects that
disrupt the formation of cooperative clusters. The distribution
of activation probabilities in the population therefore plays
a crucial role. Accordingly, we consider separately degree-
correlated activity such that Pai = ki/kmax, where kmax is the
largest degree in the network [54], as well as payoff-correlated
activity, such that
Pai (t) = Pai (t − 1) +
1
α
f (Pai ,πi)
πi(t − 1) − 〈πi〉(t−2,...,t−ki )
bki
−Pai e−τ (1−|Pai |), (2)
where Pai = Pai (t − 1) − Pai (0), Pai (0) = ki/kmax, and
〈πi〉(t−2,...,t−ki ) represents the weighted mean of the payoff
obtained by node i over the last ki time steps with weights
given by wj = (ki − j )/ki . Lastly, f (Pai ,πi) is equal to
f (Pai ,πi) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 − Pai (t − 1) if πi(t − 1) > 〈πi〉(t−2,...,t−ki )
Pai (t − 1) if πi(t − 1) < 〈πi〉(t−2,...,t−ki )
0 otherwise
.
(3)
The last term of Eq. (2) depends only on the difference between
the current activation probability and the initial activation
probability at time t = 0. Thus, the bigger the difference
between the current and the initial activation probability and
the larger the value of τ , the faster the activity of a player
will return to its original state. The second term of Eq. (2)
represents the variation that is due to the payoff obtained by
each player. We first compute the average payoff obtained
by each player over the last ki time steps so that a player
has the longer memory the higher its degree. To increase the
importance of the last rounds of the game, we weight the
average wj = (ki − j )/ki with
〈πi(t)〉(t−1,...,t−ki ) =
∑ki−1
j=0 wjπi(t − 1 − j )∑ki−1
j=0 wj
(4)
and then compute the difference between the payoff obtained
in the last round and this average, and finally normalize
it with the factor bki . In the limit where 〈πi〉 → 0 and
πi(t − 1) → bki this fraction would take the value of 1. The
function f (Pai ,πi), given by Eq. (3), which multiplies the
second term in Eq. (2), represents the difference between the
current activation probability and its upper limit if the payoff
increases and between the current activation probability and
its lower limit if the payoff decreases. Thus, in the limit where
the previous fraction takes the value of 1, this term will try to
set the activation probability to 1, whereas if it takes a value
of −1 this term will try to set it to 0. As the described change
can be quite abrupt, we include a parameter α to modulate this
behavior. In the following, we will consider α = τ without
loss of generality, thus leaving us with τ as the key parameter
determining the interplay between the linear term and the
exponential term in Eq. (2) when considering payoff-driven
activity of players.
We note that this mechanism is similar to the Pavlov strategy
(also known as win-stay-lose-shift [55–58]) but adapted to
the activation probability. Indeed, a player will tend to keep
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playing as long as it is winning but will diminish his activity if
it loses. This provides a game-exit option that was not included
in previous models [54].
III. RESULTS
Based on the consideration of limiting cases entering
Eqs. (2)–(4) and the shape of the resulting Pai (t) function, the
most interesting interval to explore in terms of the exponential
decay that determines how fast the activity of a player returns
to its default state is 1  τ  10. We thus begin by showing
representative time courses of the fraction of cooperators c
as obtained for different values of the temptation to defect b
and for different activity rules in Fig. 1. For degree-correlated
activity and since the game is staged on a scale-free network,
the cascading failures of cooperation, which are due to
frequently inactive hubs, are clearly observable, especially for
b = 2.1. On Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, on the other hand, the
activity pattern does not induce sudden drops of the fraction of
cooperators due to the lack of hubs, and thus cooperators rely
predominantly on traditional network reciprocity [54]. Also,
it can be observed that the level of cooperation on a scale-free
network requires a comparatively long time to recover from the
sudden drops, which is due to the fact that the spatiotemporal
reorganization of compact cooperative clusters requires time.
Interestingly, not all values of b expose this feature equally
well, which has to do with the fact that scale-free networks are
very potent amplifiers of cooperation [54]. Accordingly, it is
only when the cooperation level starts to drop significantly
in the population do the cascading failures become most
pronounced. As b is increased further, the overall level of
cooperation becomes so low that again the cascading failures
are less visible. For the sake of the clarity of our arguments,
we thus focus on those values of b that convey the crucial point
most clearly.
For payoff-correlated activity with τ = 1 the evolutionary
outcome is much the same as for degree-correlated activity,
with common sharp drops in the level of cooperation and
relatively long recovery periods being clearly visible for b =
2.0 and 2.1 (see upper right panel in Fig. 1). However, for
τ = 4 and τ = 8 the sudden drops in the level of cooperation
progressively vanish and overall, the time courses become
smoother. A qualitative change in the evolutionary dynamics
when going to degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity
of players is thus observable. By comparing results obtained
with τ = 4 and τ = 8 more closely, one can also infer that,
in addition to the drops vanishing, the plateau values of the
fraction of cooperators c also become lower for the larger τ
value. Accordingly, it is not immediately clear whether the
absence of drops offsets the drops in the plateau values and
thus whether payoff-correlated activity has any evolutionary
advantages to degree-correlated activity.
To shed light on the details behind the results presented
in Fig. 1, we show in Fig. 2 the cooperation probability
in dependence on the degree of players forming the scale-
free network. While for b < 2 the probability profiles differ
insignificantly across the panels, for b = 2.4 the shift towards
more cooperative hubs and more cooperative average-degree
players is evident when going from degree-correlated to
payoff-correlated activity with τ = 1,4, and 8. However,
while for τ = 1 and τ = 4 low-degree nodes still maintain
a relatively high cooperation probability too, for τ = 8 the
same probability tapers off significantly faster. Accordingly,
as τ increases hubs and average-degree nodes increase their
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FIG. 1. Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different activity rules.
Results obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top-left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-correlated activity with
τ = 1, 4, and 8 are depicted in the top-right and bottom two panels (b), (c), and (d), respectively. It can be observed, particularly for b = 2.1,
that the sharp drops in cooperation vanish when going from degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity with increasingly large values of τ .
At the same time, however, the plateau level of the fraction of cooperators drops as well.
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FIG. 2. Cooperation probability in dependence on the degree of players, as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different
activity rules. Results obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top-left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-correlated
activity with τ = 1, 4, and 8 are depicted in the top-right and bottom two panels (b), (c), and (d), respectively. The shift towards more cooperative
hubs and more cooperative average-degree players is evident when going from degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity, especially for
τ = 4 and b > 2.
chances of retaining a cooperative state, but low-degree nodes
see their chances for cooperation diminished. A clear tradeoff
thus appears to emerge between keeping the hubs and average-
degree nodes cooperating, while at the same time not losing
low-degree nodes to defection. In this sense one can already
envisage an optimal value of τ that should work best for the
resolution of severe social dilemmas.
Before making these arguments quantitatively more pre-
cise, it is also instructive to examine representative snapshots
of the network, as shown in Fig. 3, where players are color
coded in agreement with their cooperation probabilities. Also,
the size of each player corresponds to its degree in the network
(log scale). The color code is such that red is used for defectors
(Pc ≈ 0), blue for players with intermediate cooperation
probability (Pc ≈ 0.5), green for very likely cooperators (Pc 
0.9), and yellow for virtually pure cooperators (Pc > 0.9). It
can be observed at a glance that for payoff-correlated activity
with τ = 4 (lower panel) the hubs and average-degree nodes
are predominantly yellow, while for degree-correlated activity
the hubs are green at best. There is also lots of red color, i.e.,
defectors, on the periphery of both depicted giant components,
yet in neither case does this extend significantly to larger
nodes, i.e., players with a larger degree within the network.
The depicted two snapshots thus confirm that an appropriately
set value of τ can effectively increase the probability for
hubs and average-degree nodes to maintain a cooperative state
while at the same time not negatively affecting the cooperation
probability for lower-degree nodes. As observed in Fig. 2, the
latter does not necessarily hold if the value of τ increases, as
then low-degree players in the network see their cooperation
probability significantly lowered.
Results presented in Fig. 4 make our arguments made so
far quantitative, showing in the main panel how the average
fraction of cooperators in the network 〈c〉 varies in dependence
on the temptation to defect b for the traditional case with
uniform activity (traditional) and different activity patterns. It
can be observed that, especially for b > 2, where, as we have
explained above, the effects of different activity patterns are
most clearly visible in Fig. 1, the payoff-correlated activity
with τ = 4 delivers consistently best results in comparison
to all the other depicted cases. At the extreme end of the
spectrum in terms of the severity of the social dilemma,
for b = 3, cooperators die out in the traditional case and
maintain a 10% existence for degree-correlated activity, while
for payoff-correlated activity with τ = 4 up to 20% of the
population is cooperating. Moreover, the inset in Fig. 4 shows
σc(τ,1) = 〈c(τ )〉−〈c(1)〉〈c(1)〉 in dependence on τ for different values
of b to emphasize the existence of an optimal speed of
the exponential decay to baseline activity of players under
the payoff-driven rule. In particular, while the optimum for
b = 1.5 is absent, for b = 2.0 it becomes faintly inferrable
and for b = 2.4 and 3.0 it is very clear, with the optimal
value of τ being 4 and 5, respectively. This thus confirms
the existence of the tradeoff between keeping the hubs and
average-degree nodes cooperating while at the same time not
losing low-degree nodes to defection, which combined for an
optimal value of τ can lead to an optimal resolution of social
dilemmas.
As results presented in Fig. 5 show, this tradeoff is directly
reflected in the activation probabilities of players when plotted
against their degrees in the network. While the degree-
correlated activity in the form Pai = ki/kmax where kmax, of
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FIG. 3. Snapshot of the giant component of the network, as
obtained using degree-correlated (top) and payoff-correlated (bottom)
activity at b = 2.4 and τ = 4. The size of the players is proportional
to their degree in the complete network and their color is proportional
to their cooperation probability as follows: red for defective nodes
(Pc ≈ 0), blue for nodes with intermediate cooperation probability
(Pc ≈ 0.5), green for highly cooperating nodes (Pc  0.9), and
yellow for almost pure cooperators (Pc > 0.9). Evidently, yellow
color is more common among high-degree and average-degree nodes
in the bottom network, where payoff-correlated activity is applied.
course, linearly interpolates between the player with the lowest
and the highest degree, payoff-correlated activity increasingly
deviates from this linear profile as τ increases in an S-shaped
manner. Thus, both hubs and low-degree players become less
active at the expense of average-degree hubs, which in turn see
their activation probability increased. This transition is more
pronounced the higher the value of the temptation to defect
b, which also explains why the effects of the optimal value of
τ are more pronounced at larger values of b. Nevertheless,
the fact that hubs would be able to better maintain their
cooperative state despite being active less of the time is
contradictory and opposes the argument we put forward for
degree-correlated activity—namely, that it induces cascading
failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free
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FIG. 4. Average fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
temptation to defect b, as obtained for the traditional version of the
game with a uniform activity profile (TD), with degree-correlated
activity (degree), and with payoff-correlated activity (τ = 1,4,8).
The inset shows the normalized difference of the average fraction
of cooperators (see main text for details) in dependence on the
exponential decay rate to baseline activity τ . Both results in the
main panel and the inset show that there exists an optimal value of
τ at which, particularly for b > 2, the level of cooperation in the
population is highest.
networks due to frequently inactive hubs. But looking at
hubs alone as the backbone of cooperation is misleading.
As recently emphasized by Morone and Makse [59] and
shown explicitly for the evolution of cooperation in [60],
not just the degree matters for the players to have a strong
influence on the population but also their neighborhoods. So
even average-degree and low-degree players can be optimal
influencers if they are surrounded by a hierarchy of high-degree
hubs. As can be inferred from the networks depicted in Fig. 3
and as is in general well known, hubs in a scale-free network
tend to be hierarchically linked so that the hubs, which are
also the oldest nodes, are preferentially linked with nodes of
similar degree (and age). Thus, supporting a healthy activity of
average-degree players can be advantageous for the successful
evolution of cooperation, even if it means the highest-degree
nodes having a slightly lower activity in return, because the
higher probability of cooperation of average-degree players
helps the hubs to maintain cooperation too. In this argument,
there is of course also an optimal tradeoff between just how
much activity of high-degree nodes should be sacrificed for
the higher activity of average-degree nodes, which in our case
turns out to be warranted by τ = 4 in Eq. (2), and which,
as shown in the inset of Fig. 4, ensures the highest level of
cooperation at sufficiently large values of b.
As the final result to corroborate our arguments, we show
in Fig. 6 how the cooperation probability depends on the
activation probability for two different values of b; for both of
which the optimal value of τ is clearly inferable in Fig. 4. For
clarity, the degree of players with the corresponding values
is also color coded via the color bar on the right of the
figure. First, it can be observed that for b = 3.0 (bottom three
panels), the overall P (c) values are lower than for b = 2.4,
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FIG. 5. Activation probability in dependence on the degree of players as obtained for different values of b (see legend) and with different
activity rules. Results obtained with degree-correlated activity are depicted in the top-left panel (a), while results obtained with payoff-correlated
activity with τ = 1, 4, and 8 are depicted in the top-right and bottom two panels (b), (c), and (d), respectively. The shift from a linear interpolation
of activity for the degree-correlated case to an S-shaped distribution as τ increases is clearly visible, especially for b > 2. Note that for the
degree-correlated case Pai = ki/kmax, and thus P (a) is independent of b.
which is expected because of the higher severity of the social
dilemma. Comparing the panels from left to right in both
rows, however, shows quite clearly that for τ = 4 (middle),
the activity probability of average-degree hubs is higher than
for τ = 1, and these players also have a higher probability
of cooperation. At the same time, hubs lose some of their
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FIG. 6. Cooperation probability in dependence on the activation probability for each player using payoff-correlated activity with different
values of τ and two different values of the temptation to defect b [(a) τ = 1, b = 2.4; (b) τ = 4, b = 2.4; (c) τ = 8, b = 2.4; (d) τ = 1,
b = 3.0; (e) τ = 4, b = 3.0; (f) τ = 8, b = 3.0]. In addition, the degree of each player is color coded with the color bar on the right. For details
regarding the interpretation of these results we refer to the main text.
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activation, but their probability to cooperate goes up as well,
which as we have argued, is driven by the revived status of the
average-degree players. As τ = 8 the fast decay to baseline
activity imposes a sharp barrier, which is particularly visible
for b = 3.0, which prevents the activity pattern to have a
noticeable impact on the evolutionary outcome, effectively
returning a result similar to the traditional version of the game
where each player has a uniform activity.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the impact of different activity patterns on
the evolution of cooperation in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
game on scale-free networks. Through the introduction of dif-
ferent individual activation probabilities, we have considered
degree-correlated and payoff-correlated activity patterns, with
the latter also having a tunable exponential decays to baseline
activity. In both cases, we have assumed that active players
play the game with their neighbors and obtain their payoffs
accordingly, while inactive players do not play and thus end
up with a null payoff. In agreement with this, only active
players were able to pass their strategies to their neighbors,
while inactive players were unable to do likewise. Within
this setup, we have shown that degree-correlated activity
introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are due to
frequently inactive hubs. This in turn invokes the need for the
spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters,
which takes comparatively long, thus resulting in an overall
lower cooperation level. Conversely, for payoff-correlated
activity with an intermediately fast decay to baseline activity,
we have demonstrated the existence of optimal conditions
for the resolution of social dilemmas. In particular, we have
shown that in this case the inactivity of hubs is compensated
effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players.
The sudden drops in the level of cooperation therefore no
longer occur and an overall higher level of cooperation in the
population is attained.
We have further corroborated our main conclusions with the
study of the average activity of players in dependence on their
degree, showing that under the optimal conditions both the
hubs and the low-degree players have a comparatively lower
activity than under degree-correlated activity rule, while at
the same time average-degree nodes have an elevated activity.
There is a transition from linear activity profiles to an S-shaped
activity profile in dependence on the degree. In this sense,
the optimal result is on first glance contradictory, since, as
is well known, cooperative hubs act as important centers of
sizable and compact communities of cooperators on scale-free
networks [23]. It would thus seem prohibitive that an even
lower level of activity would improve the chances of success
for cooperation. As it turns out, since the average-degree
nodes are more active and since they are predominantly linked
directly to the hubs, their increased activity acts as a protector
against a strategy change towards defection. Here the concept
of collective influence, as recently introduced by Morone and
Makse [59], becomes crucial in that a more wholesome take
on the problem that goes beyond an individual’s degree and
hub status is needed. In a nutshell, many average-degree
and even low-degree nodes can be optimal influencers if
they are “surrounded by hierarchical coronas of hubs.” Thus,
supporting a healthy activity of average-degree players, even
if it is at the expense of the hubs, ultimately turns out to
be advantageous for sustenance of cooperation. Notably, a
similar argument was recently introduced in [60] to explain
the optimal distribution of the potency of players for passing
their strategies in a network.
We conclude by noting that even the relatively simple
considerations of different activity patterns in evolutionary
games reveal remarkable complexity in the underlying dynam-
ics, involving cascading failures that present as asymmetric
dynamic instabilities in the time course of the evolution of
the two competing strategies under degree-correlated activity,
and the progressive annihilation thereof under appropriately
fine-tuned payoff-correlated activity. Although properly taking
into account the diversity of individual activities of play-
ers [61,62] is certainly an important aspect of bringing models
closer to real-life conditions, it nevertheless seems a daunting
proposition to add to the complexity of the studied model.
In the future, it would be interesting to see experiments on
human cooperation with an exit strategy, as studied before
experimentally in the ultimatum game [63], while modeling
and simulation efforts could be directed towards relative time
scales in evolutionary dynamics [64], in that the typical time
for an activation change is likely to be different from the time
needed to make a strategy change. We hope that this paper will
motivate further research along this line in the near future, as
well as draw attention to the importance of collective influence
in networks for the evolution of cooperation in particular and
for social phenomena ranging from efficient immunization to
the diffusion of information in general.
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